Hidden game at sea: The Russian and Iranian “ghost fleet” disappears from radar

The use of concealment tactics and data manipulation is increasing in the Strait of Hormuz

Tactics involving disappearance and route manipulation, characteristic of the so-called “ghost fleet,” have intensified in the Strait of Hormuz following the U.S. naval blockade targeting Iran-linked shipping, according to an article by The New York Times.

In recent days, maritime intelligence experts have identified a rise in maneuvers aimed at evading surveillance, such as disabling transmitters and manipulating identification codes on vessels operating near Iranian waters.

Iran is adopting methods inspired by Russia’s “ghost fleet” technology to bypass the U.S. blockade in the Strait of Hormuz. These practices include turning off tracking systems and falsifying identification data, allowing ships to disappear from radar and reappear with altered identities challenging international monitoring and U.S. restrictions, according to the report.

According to Amy Daniel, director at Windward, a shift in the behavior of Iranian vessels has recently been observed. She noted that “more ships have started disabling their tracking systems or modifying identification codes” within 24 hours after the tightening of the blockade behavior that was rare even after the February U.S.-Israel strike, when Iranian exports were not significantly disrupted.

Russian influence on sanction-evasion techniques

New sanction-evasion patterns in the Gulf of Oman mirror techniques developed by Russia’s “ghost fleet” after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

According to The New York Times, Russian ships have experimented with manipulating identification numbers, sometimes falsifying origin or destination to bypass international sanctions.

In addition to switching off tracking devices, some Iran-linked ships may disappear from monitoring screens at one point and reappear elsewhere, sometimes with altered data.

Thanks to these methods, Russia has managed to maintain key energy exports and secure revenues of up to $100 billion annually, the report notes.

Windward has identified that operators are testing the effective limits of international surveillance in real time, despite increased restrictions. The analysis cited by The New York Times shows continuous movement of sanctioned ships or vessels using false flags, signaling ongoing adaptation of these techniques.

Although these tactics pose a serious challenge in other contexts, experts cited by The New York Times warn that their effectiveness is more limited in the Strait of Hormuz. Erik Bethel of Mare Liberum emphasizes that the informational environment in this area is “contested and extremely complex,” making it difficult to identify responsibility for each route.

The international maritime transport system is highly complex: a ship may be owned by one state, leased by another, and sail under the flag of a third country, complicating the determination of ultimate responsibility for any voyage.

The presence of the United States Navy, with more than 12 warships deployed in the region, increases the risk for those using such strategies. According to the report, despite efforts to “disappear,” it is difficult to pass through such a narrow corridor into open waters without being detected, due to continuous monitoring through visual means, radar, and electronic communications.

During the observed period, United States Central Command reported that six commercial vessels complied with U.S. forces’ orders and returned to Iranian ports, demonstrating the effectiveness of the imposed restrictions.

Ultimately, the report emphasizes that the ability to bypass blockades depends not only on military presence, but primarily on the quality and speed of information available to both U.S. forces and maritime intelligence agencies in the region.

“KORÇA BOOM”